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Abstract 
We evaluate an immigrant workplace introduction program aimed at helping 
individuals considered employable but at the same time expected to experience 
substantial difficulties in finding work. Using supported employment methods, 
the SIN program may influence outcomes through several channels. We use in-
dividual data and a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of 
the program. The results suggest that the program increased transitions from 
unemployment to work experience schemes, and improved future employment 
probabilities for those who entered these schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
The integration of immigrants in the labor market has caused Swedish politi-
cians much agony in recent years. In an international perspective, Sweden 
stands out as one of the countries with the lowest labor force participation and 
the highest unemployment levels among the foreign-born (OECD 2005). In 
2002, unemployment stood at 4 percent in the native population. At the same 
time it was 15 percent among those born outside Europe. Also, the chance of 
moving from unemployment to employment is substantially lower in many 
immigrant groups in comparison to natives (Åslund & Rooth 2005). It is some-
times argued that simple comparisons to other countries do not account for the 
fact that Sweden has received a comparatively large fraction of refugees, who 
generally have worse outcomes than labor migrants (see e.g. Integrationsverket 
2006). Still, the fact that a large proportion of the foreign-born population has a 
disadvantaged labor market position remains. 
The Swedish government has adopted a variety of policies and programs to 
combat the problematic situation. Measures range from special local introduc-
tion programs for the recently arrived, via priority regulations at the PES of-
fices, to large-scale neighborhood development programs. This paper evaluates 
a program on trial since September 2003, which in some respects goes one step 
further in its interventions. Using “supported employment” methods previously 
employed for disabled workers, the SIN (Special INtroduction) program targets 
immigrants and refugees who are considered capable of taking a job immedi-
ately, but who are also (at risk of becoming) long-term unemployed. 
Once enrolled in SIN, the job searcher is assigned to a special employment 
officer with considerably fewer clients at his/her hands than what is usual. The 
work is formally divided into six steps. The first step is to analyze the 
searcher’s merits, potentials and preferences. Then “job gathering” com-
mences, followed by so-called job analysis where it is investigated whether the 
conceived tasks or workplace need to be adapted in any way. The last three 
steps are: workplace introduction, employment, and follow-up. We will discuss 
the methodology further in section 2. 
SIN is run in 20 municipalities, many of which are situated in the metropoli-
tan areas of Sweden, where the bulk of the targeted population lives. Previous 
studies have found that participation is quite selective in terms of being “job 
ready”, i.e. participants should be capable of managing a job and willing to 
make the move into employment (Hernemar 2004, Lindgren Åsbrink 2005). 
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These facts have implications for the design of this study of the effects of the 
program. First, despite the availability of very detailed population micro data 
on the unemployed, we are unlikely to capture all factors determining participa-
tion in SIN. Second, the implementation of the pilot opens up for a difference-
in-differences analysis comparing the before-after change in SIN municipalities 
to other municipalities in the same local labor market. Naturally, this method-
ology also allows for the possibility that SIN may have affected unemployed 
non-participants. We will thus estimate the effects of SIN on the population at 
risk in the participating municipalities, i.e. we apply a reduced form estimator 
at the municipal level. 
We consider two alternative outcomes—employment and open unemploy-
ment—and argue that the main effects of SIN may work through different 
channels: (i) it can affect the hazard from open unemployment to employment 
orto  an intermediate treatment (IMT) (e.g. employment subsidies or work ex-
perience schemes); (ii) it may influence the flows back to open unemployment 
from employment or IMT:s; (iii) it may affect the transitions from IMT:s to 
employment. The third channel can consist of two parts: a change in the distri-
bution of intermediate states combined with the impact differences between in-
termediate outcomes (in the absence of SIN), and, secondly, a change in the ef-
fects from entering a particular intermediate state on the final outcome.  
To get at the mechanisms at work, we estimate several sets of Cox regres-
sion models, comparing before-after changes in the SIN locations to the same 
changes in the non-SIN locations. Our findings suggest that SIN increases the 
rate of transitions into work experience schemes. Also, entry to work experi-
ence schemes is associated with higher chances of becoming employed under 
SIN than otherwise. SIN does not appear to have affected the flows back to 
open unemployment from work or from IMT:s. The interpretation of a (statisti-
cally and economically) positive significant difference-in-differences estimate 
on the hazard from unemployment to work is complicated by the fact that ana-
lyzing a “fake reform” supposed to have occurred one year before the actual re-
form yields a similar estimate. 
In the next section we give some detail on the design of the SIN program 
and its implementation. In section 3 we present the data, describe the SIN par-
ticipants in terms of background characteristics, and sketch what happens when 
someone enters SIN. Section 4 first discusses some conceptual methodological 
issues and then outlines the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results on 
the effects of SIN. Section 6 concludes. 
IFAU – Virtues of SIN—effects of an immigrant workplace introduction program  4  
 
2  Program setup and implementation
1 
SIN was introduced in 20 Swedish municipalities on September 1, 2003. Ini-
tially it was scheduled to run until December 31, 2005, but the trial period was 
later extended to December 31, 2006.
2 It is administered by local PES offices 
which have been granted extra funding for the case workers working with the 
SIN participants. In 2005, the resources added amounted to a total of SEK 126 
million, resulting in some 250 SIN officers (Ams 2006b). According to the De-
cember 2005 report from the labor market board, 4,781 individuals entered SIN 
during 2005 (Ams 2006a). The typical SIN officer appears to have somewhere 
between 15 and 30 clients. A cautious comparison to other PES officers sug-
gests that this is about one tenth of the normal caseload. Note also that the 
funding only covers the SIN officers—resources for e.g. employment subsidies 
or work experience schemes are taken from the regular budget. 
2.1 Targeted  groups 
According to the government bill (Förordning 2003:623), the program may be 
offered to immigrants or refugees age 20 or above. The individual can be in 
SIN for a maximum of six months. Under (unspecified) extraordinary circum-
stances, however, the period can be prolonged. The participants should be 
reckoned capable of taking a job immediately, but also (at risk of becoming) 
long-term unemployed. SIN may be granted people who fulfill only the first 
criterion, but are in (or have completed) a local refugee introduction program. 
In other words, the rules for program eligibility are very loose since it suffices 
to (i) be at risk of becoming long-term unemployed, or (ii) to have completed a 
local introduction program any period of time ago. We will present characteris-
tics of the participants in section 3.2. 
Normally, SIN should not be chosen before testing other alternatives (i.e. 
standard job search assistance, other labor market programs). To assign an in-
                                                      
 
1 The section draws primarily on Ams (2004a,b) 
2 During 2005, four municipalities were effectively added to the SIN trials. The participating 
municipality of Eskilstuna then started serving also Flen, Katrineholm, Nyköping and Vingåker. 
These are small towns compared to most of the other participating locations. We will attend to 
the expansion in the robustness checks. 
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dividual to the program, the case worker should have estimated the need for 
support to be larger than the need for qualified job-matching assistance. The 
SIN officers are not to be considered just an extra resource for job matching. 
2.2  The methods of SIN—in theory  
SIN is based on so-called “supported employment”, which have been devel-
oped for, and previously used in, programs attending to disabled workers (see 
Antonsson (2003) or Leach (2002) for discussions). After having been judged 
suitable for SIN, the job searcher is assigned to a SIN officer, and then the 
process is divided into six steps: 
1.  Job searcher analysis 
2.  Job gathering 
3.  Work analysis 
4.  Workplace introduction 
5.  Follow-up 
6.  Employment 
The first step is the “job searcher analysis”, in which the case worker inter-
views and maps the individual’s merits, potentials and wishes. If the individual 
does not have a CV or validated credentials, he or she should be remitted to the 
regular PES for this purpose. The second step of the process is “job gathering”, 
when the case worker looks for suitable work. The case worker should then in-
form the prospective employers that the aim of the program is employment, 
even though the workplace introduction can begin with a trainee position. 
However, there should be a promise of future employment for a particular 
workplace to come into question for placement. 
Work analysis is the third step, in which the SIN officer investigates 
whether tasks and work environment suits the participant. If necessary, the of-
ficer can discuss possible changes in the tasks with the employer. In this step it 
is also to be made clear which type of support the officer can give during the 
workplace introduction. Then, the workplace introduction begins. The intro-
duction is to be performed in close cooperation between the SIN participant, 
the officer, the employer, colleagues, and union representatives. The officer’s 
presence at the workplace is supposed to facilitate the participant getting 
started with the job tasks, and to, e.g., help overcoming language barriers or 
making sure that the participant becomes a part of the workplace community. 
When the SIN period is over (usually after six months), the officer performs 
a follow-up of the assignment. This is considered particularly important since 
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employment within the program is often on a temporary basis, and there is a 
wish to make sure that the individual actually gets hired. 
2.3  SIN in practice 
Some work on SIN has been done previously. First, there are the reports from 
the labor market board to the central government (e.g. Ams 2005). These gen-
erally carry a positive notion of SIN, where it is argued that even though the 
measure does not in all cases end in employment, the outcomes are good com-
pared to other programs. One thing worth noting is that SIN officers had to be 
recruited externally in about 70 percent of the cases. According to the labor 
market board, this meant that SIN was not fully up and running until the fall of 
2004 (Ams 2005). We will return to this issue below. 
There are also two studies which have performed interviews with partici-
pants, officers and (in one study) employers (Hernemar 2005, Lindgren Ås-
brink 2006). The overall impression from these interviews is that participation 
is quite selective. The officers stress the importance of being “job ready”. This 
means having sufficient Swedish language skills, not being in need of any type 
of rehabilitation and being willing to commute or relocate if necessary. Accord-
ing to these two studies (and to the Ams (2005) report), the main benefit of the 
program is that the officers have considerably more time with each client, in-
creasing the potential for a successful match. The interviews suggest that the 
workplace introduction and follow-up have played a smaller part in the imple-
mentation. In practice, the officers do thus not appear to stick to the supported 
employment methodology. 
The interviewed employers express the feeling that they can trust that the 
individuals coming from SIN are really right for the job. Some employers state 
that it may be easier handling minor conflicts via the officer than with the em-
ployee directly. Some officers, however, express the view that it would be very 
stigmatizing with a strong case worker presence during the introduction, since 
this would signal low capability of the applicant.
3
                                                      
 
3 In fact, the point that supported employment methodology may be stigmatizing and not trans-
ferable to the case of immigrants was made at a very early planning stage (see Carling 2003).  
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3  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 The  data 
We use data from the IFAU database covering the entire Swedish population 
age 16–65. The data contain detailed individual information on registered un-
employment spells up to November 15, 2005. The information includes date of 
unemployment entry, whether the individual is in open unemployment or in 
some type of program (and if so, which program) at any point in time during 
registered unemployment, and date of and reason for leaving unemployment 
(e.g. finding a job, regular education, leaving the work force etc.). 
We include individuals who entered open unemployment between January 
1, 2000 and November 15, 2005, and who were at least 20 and less than 63 
years old at the time of unemployment entry. An individual may have multiple 
spells. In the baseline analysis, we include individuals who were born outside 
the Nordic countries. We will, however, discuss robustness checks with vary-
ing restrictions on region of birth. There is also a restriction implying that only 
those who were registered at a PES located in the local labor market of (at 
least) one of the SIN-participating municipalities are included. This is because 
we want the comparison group to be subject to the local shocks experienced by 
the treatment group. Local labor markets are defined by Statistics Sweden 
based on observed commuting behavior. A local labor market consists of one 
or (usually) several municipalities. No municipality belongs to more than one 
local labor market. We use the 2003 definition of local labor market regions. 
The analysis focuses on two final outcomes: employment and open unem-
ployment. People are followed for the duration of open unemployment. Then, 
we register four types of transitions: (i) to (regular) employment (permanent or 
temporary); (ii) to subsidized employment; (iii) to work experience schemes; 
(iv) to “other” categories. The fourth type of exit contains those who have de-
registered for “unknown” reasons (which is employment in about 50 percent of 
the cases (see Bring & Carling 2000, Sahin 2003, Forslund et al. 2004), those 
who have left for regular education or labor market training, and those who be-
come enrolled in other types of labor market programs than the ones covered 
by (ii) and (iii). We label exit types (ii), (iii) and (iv) intermediate treatments 
(IMT:s). 
Similarly, we monitor transitions from employment or IMT:s back to open 
unemployment, and from IMT:s to employment. Employment is defined as ei-
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ther being registered at the PES in a category indicating regular employment 
(temporary, part-time, looking for other work), or having “found work” as the 
latest reason for deregistration.
4
Table 1 displays some basic facts about the data. There are just below half a 
million unemployment spells and about 222,000 individuals in the data
5. The 
median spell of open unemployment lasts 112 days. On average, each spell was 
preceded by a total of 247 days in labor market programs and 641 days of open 
unemployment
6. The SIN municipalities have “worse” track records: spells last 
a bit longer and the unemployed have spent more time in unemployment and 
labor market programs. Note that “SIN” in this context means being registered 
in a participating municipality. The actual SIN participants (who are a small 
portion of the total number of individuals) are described in the next section. 
                                                      
 
4 People who find temporary, part-time, or not fully satisfactory work may remain registered at 
the PES.  
5 Note the difference to Table 1 which displays the number of individuals conditional on time pe-
riod and location. 
6 The starting year is 1991. 
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Table 1 Basic data description 
    Time period (relative to Sep. 1, 2003) 
Municipality   Before  After  Total 
Non-SIN #  observations  82,921  58,943  141,864 
(comparison) #  individuals  48,542 42,771 91,313 
  Median spell length  105  103  104 
  Average time in LMP  236  216  228 
  Average time in open unempl.  582  557  572 
       
SIN  #  observations  203,266 142,064 345,330 
(treatment) #  individuals  114,056 100,708 214,764 
  Median spell length  121  107  115 
  Average time in LMP  264  241  254 
  Average time in open unempl.  683  651  670 
       
Total  #  observations  286,187 201,007 487,194 
  #  individuals  162,598 143,479 306,077 
  Median spell length  116  106  112 
  Average time in LMP  256  234  247 
  Average time in open unempl.  654  623  641 
Notes: SIN municipalities are the ones that participate in the trials starting September 1, 
2003. “Spell length” is for completed spells in open unemployment (in days), “time in LMP 
(unempl.)” is days spent in labor market programs (open unemployment) since August 1991 
prior to the start of the current spell. Note that average spell length is longer in the before pe-
riod, which is partly a result of longer time until censoring on November 15, 2005. The # in-
dividuals are conditional on location and time period; an individual may be counted in multi-
ple cells (first spell in each period and location). The total number of individuals observed is 
222,269. 
 
3.2 Descriptive  statistics 
3.2.1  Who participates in SIN? 
Let us now describe the SIN participants. Table 2 below shows that most of the 
participants were born in Asia, Africa or in European countries outside EU15. 
Iraq, Iran and former Yugoslavia are the most common countries of birth ac-
cording to Ams (2005). Note, however, that the numbers are conditional on be-
ing born outside the Nordic countries. As a matter of fact, about 5 percent of 
the participants were born in Sweden. All in all, there are about 7,000 SIN par-
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ticipants in the data. The participation rate is between 6 and 7 percent (based on 
the unemployment inflow in 2003–2004 in the SIN municipalities). With such 
a low probability of participation, the possibility that people relocate to become 
eligible for SIN should not be a serious concern for the evaluation. Neverthe-
less, we performed an analysis of relocations into and out of the (non-)SIN mu-
nicipalities. The results did not suggest that SIN changed the mobility patterns 
in any substantial way. 
Some of the regulations governing SIN signal that the measure is at least 
partly intended for recently arrived. It is therefore interesting to find that while 
30 percent of the participants have immigrated since the year 2000, approxi-
mately half of the sample actually came before 1995. 
We also see that there are somewhat more males among the participants, 
and that the three education categories (primary, secondary, tertiary) each con-
tain roughly one third of the participants. Somewhat noteworthy is the fact that 
only about one quarter of the people in SIN has an updated plan for action ac-
cording to the administrative records.
7 Since the SIN methodology stipulates 
quite extensive considerations of different alternatives available, this seems to 
be an administrative flaw in the sense that all information is not entered into the 
registers. The table also shows that 30 percent of the participants are not eligi-
ble for any type of unemployment benefits. Typically, these individuals are 
supported by social assistance. 
 
                                                      
 
7 Updated means that the plan was created or changed in the calendar year of the start of the un-
employment spell linked to SIN. 
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Table 2 Description of the SIN participants born outside the Nordic countries 
Region of birth   
EU15 2.91 
Europe except EU15  27.88 
Africa 18.77 
North America  1.59 













Male  56.6 
Age at unemployment entry  36.7 (9.0) 




Fraction with updated action plan  24.6 
Coded as not eligible for benefits  30.53 
Registered in SIN municipality  97.2 
   
# observations  7,292 
Notes: Information on SIN participation and unemployment is taken from separate regis-
ters. The dates of SIN start and end do not necessarily comply with the timing of unem-
ployment spells. Time varying variables are therefore measured for the unemployment 
spell linked to SIN participation according to the following hierarchical criteria: (i) SIN 
start date is within the spell; (ii) the spell ending at the shortest time before the SIN start 
date; (iii) the spell beginning at the shortest time after the SIN start date. 
 
 
Recall that SIN is supposed to target individuals who are believed to have 
substantial difficulties finding work. Some regulations hint that it may be peo-
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ple who have limited labor market experience in Sweden due to short residence 
(which is true in about a quarter of the cases). Also, SIN should be considered 
the best alternative and not be chosen before testing other alternatives. Re-
membering the low employment rates in some groups of foreign-born, one 
might wonder how the SIN participants compare to other unemployed with 
similar background. Table 3 shows characteristics of individuals entering open 
unemployment during 2003 and 2004, by eventual observation in the SIN pro-
gram. The non-participants have been re-weighted to conform to the region-of-
origin/period-of-immigration distribution of the participants. In other words, 
the comparison controls for regional background and time spent in Sweden. 
The distribution of education is very similar across the two groups—if any-
thing SIN participants are positively selected. The participants have spent con-
siderably more time in open unemployment and labor market programs, which 
is not surprising given that one can qualify for SIN by being long-term unem-
ployed. What is perhaps more surprising is that the participants are much less 
likely to be coded “not eligible for any type of benefit”. Even though this vari-
able taken from an administrative register does not necessarily reflect actual 
unemployment benefits (UB) eligibility at a given point in time,
8 the pattern 
signals that SIN participants may not have less attachment to the labor market 
than other unemployed with similar backgrounds. This conclusion is also sup-
ported by the fact that the 2002 employment and earnings statistics are very 
similar across the groups. Even though the outcomes are poor on average, there 
is among the participants clearly a substantial fraction with experience from the 
Swedish labor market.
9 One could ask why individuals who may have spent 
more than 20 years in Sweden and who were employed as late as 2002 are in 
need of a workplace introduction program partly intended to bridge linguistic 
and cultural gaps. 
 
                                                      
 
8 The variable is based on which UB fund the individual belongs to. Those who do not belong to 
any fund or whose benefits have expired should be coded “00” which is what the table entry is 
based on. However, one can not be certain that this information is updated if, e.g., benefits expire 
during an unemployment spell. 
9 Not surprisingly, employment rates increase with time spent in Sweden. 47 percent of partici-
pants arriving 1980-84 were employed; for those who came earlier the figure was 53 percent. 
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Table 3 Comparison of SIN participants and non-participants. Weighted by re-
gion of origin and immigration period 
 SIN  participants  Non-participants 
Primary education (%)  32.3  33.9 
Secondary education (%)  36.2  36.2 
Tertiary education (%)  31.4  29.7 
Coded as not eligible for benefits (%)  32.4  42.5 
Average time in open unempl.  669.6  560.2 
Average time in LMP  291.7  213.2 
Employment 2002  35.6  36.1 
Average earnings 2002  59,200  58,350 
Notes: Table presents averages of variables for individuals who entered open unemploy-
ment 2003–2004, by SIN participation before Nov 15, 2005. Non-participants have been 
re-weighted to conform to the region-of-origin/period-of-immigration distribution of the 
SIN participants. There is a very small number of observations without information on 
education; this category is excluded from the table and thus the numbers do not add to 100. 
Measures of employment and average earnings are limited to individuals observed in 2002. 
 
3.3  What happens when someone enters SIN? 
Table 4 shows the status of the SIN participants 3 days before the start date of 
SIN. 70 percent are in open unemployment, whereas about 10 percent are clas-
sified as employed. Few are in subsidized employment and some are in work 
experience schemes. A significant portion is also found in the category “other”. 
Further examination reveals that about half of these individuals are in “match-
ing and guiding activities”, one quarter is in preparatory education and about 
15 percent is in labor market training. 
 
Table 4 Status 3 days before SIN entry 
Status Freq.  Percent 
Unemployed 5,133  70.39 
Employed 788  10.81 
Subsidized employment  54  0.74 
Work experience  340  4.66 
Other 977  13.40 
Total 7,292  100.00 
Notes: 3 observations dropped due to SIN start scheduled after November 15, 2005. 
 
IFAU – Virtues of SIN—effects of an immigrant workplace introduction program  14 
 
Table 5 then shows the status of the participants on the starting day of SIN, 
and 3, 14 and 28 days later, in total and by status 3 days before SIN start. Ob-
viously, many individuals leave open unemployment for work experience 
schemes or regular or subsidized employment. There appears to be transitions 
just around the SIN start, and then a gradual shift during the first weeks of SIN. 
After four weeks, 36 percent is in regular employment, 20 percent in subsidized 
employment and about 23 percent of the participants are in work experience 
schemes. The latter share is substantially higher just after entry to SIN, suggest-
ing that some participants go via work experience to some form of employ-
ment. The share in open unemployment is 11 percent after 28 days in SIN. Of 
those in the “other” category, about one third is no longer registered at the PES. 
Among those who are, 38 percent are in “matching and guidance activities”, 16 
percent are in some form of training, 14 percent are in programs primarily in-
tended for those with (occupational) disabilities, such as wage subsidies or 
sheltered employment. 
There are also movements between the other states. Only half of those who 
were in a work experience scheme three days prior to SIN remain there on the 
day of SIN entry. The bulk of these transitions are to some form of employ-
ment. 28 days after entry, 35 (24) percent of those who started in work experi-
ence are in subsidized (regular) employment. 
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Table 5 Status on and after SIN entry, by status 3 days before entry 
3 days before  Unempl.  Employed  Subs empl.  Work exp  Other 
 Day  of  entry 
Unemployed 16.15 22.09 13.66 40.04  8.07 
Employed  0.25 70.43 11.93 14.85  2.54 
Subs.  empl 0.00 5.56  88.89 1.85 3.70 
Work  exp  4.41 18.24 27.35 47.35  2.65 
Other  5.22 15.35 19.55 22.31 37.56 
Total 12.30 26.11 15.46 35.00 11.14 
  3 days after entry 
Unemployed 11.57 26.42 14.11 39.63  8.26 
Employed  0.76 69.29 12.56 14.59  2.79 
Subs.  empl. 1.85 5.56  87.04 1.85 3.70 
Work  exp  4.41 19.71 27.65 45.59  2.65 
Other  3.99 19.75 20.57 23.54 32.14 
Total  8.98 29.69 15.98 34.77 10.57 
  14 days after entry 
Unemployed 11.12 31.05 15.89 33.84  8.09 
Employed  2.17 69.68 13.38 12.23  2.55 
Subs  empl 0.00 7.41  87.04 1.85 3.70 
Work  exp  5.29 23.24 31.76 36.76  2.94 
Other  3.79 23.87 23.26 21.11 27.97 
Total  8.82 33.71 17.88 29.70  9.89 
  28 days after entry 
Unemployed 13.51 34.57 18.14 26.47  7.31 
Employed 3.88  69.73  14.23 9.57 2.59 
Subs  empl 3.77 9.43  83.02 1.89 1.89 
Work  exp  8.33 24.40 35.71 27.68  3.87 
Other  5.83 25.03 25.66 17.29 26.19 
Total 11.13 36.46 20.03 23.28  9.10 
 
The conclusions from this description are the following. First, it is clear that 
SIN usually means entry into some form of treatment/outcome, i.e. regular or 
subsidized employment or work experience schemes. Second, the patterns sig-
nal that the administrative start dates of SIN most likely do not mark the actual 
start dates in many cases. Remember that the first two steps of the SIN meth-
odology are to map out the participants capabilities as well as wishes and to 
find a suitable workplace. We would therefore not expect to see so many transi-
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tions into categories indicating being at a workplace around the actual SIN start 
date. Thus, the SIN start dates must be considered inaccurate in many cases. As 
a matter of fact, the same is true for the SIN end dates, since these typically are 
set at the same time as the start dates (many times resulting in a 180-day pe-
riod). Note however, that the empirical analysis presented below captures a re-
duced form effect of SIN, which is not based on observations of individual SIN 
participation. 
4 Methodological  considerations 
We begin this section by outlining the conceptual framework for the effects of 
SIN, focusing on the different components entailed in the SIN program. Then 
we discuss how to retrieve these estimates in practice and which identifying as-
sumptions we need to make. 
4.1 Conceptual  framework 
Let us first discuss how SIN may affect the outcomes of interest, here chosen to 
be employment or alternatively open unemployment. Figure 1 illustrates how 
we think about the potential mechanisms at work. All individuals under study 
start out in open unemployment. Consider first the potential effects going from 
this state to other states. SIN may affect the individual’s probability to move di-
rectly from open unemployment to employment. Secondly, it may alter the 
chances to enter intermediate treatments (IMT:s): work experience, employ-
ment subsidies and the summary category other (which includes e.g. labor 
market training and guidance activities at the PES). 
The intermediate treatments may then in turn affect the future labor market 
opportunities among the unemployed. A change in the distribution of IMT:s 
towards treatments that improve the chances of entering employment is one po-
tential effect. SIN may also influence the likelihood of moving from a given 
IMT to employment. 
There may also be similar impacts on the flows in the other directions 
(dashed arrows in the figure): to open unemployment from employment or 
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from any of the IMT:s respectively. Of course, one could argue that SIN would 
influence flows between the different IMT:s or the probability to move from 
employment to an IMT. We argue, however, that the flows described above are 









Figure 1 Conceptual framework of the effects of SIN 
 
Following this description, the evaluation of SIN can be split into four steps. 
First we estimate how SIN affects the hazard (or probability) to employment 
and to three different IM treatments (employment subsidy, work experience 
and all other types of activities within the PES). Second, we estimate the haz-
ard back to open unemployment from employment and the three different 
IMT:s. Third, we consider the impact of SIN on employment after entering any 
IMT (regardless of which). Fourth, for each IMT we estimate the hazard to 
employment, i.e. an effect conditional on entering a particular IMT. In the next 
section we will discuss how to identify the parameters of interest. 
4.2  Identification and estimation 
If individuals were selected randomly to participate in SIN from the group of 
eligible individuals, then we could simply estimate the effects using Cox re-
gression models comparing participants to non-participants. The basic estima-
                                                      
 
10 A sensitivity analysis suggests that SIN did not affect the excluded types of transitions. 
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tion problem is that we do not have random selection into SIN. The institu-
tional setting suggests that most likely there is substantial selection into SIN at 
the individual level. We will therefore not base our estimates on individual SIN 
participation. Instead we will use difference-in-differences (DiD) estimators at 
the municipal level. Our estimates are therefore the reduced forms effects of 
entering unemployment in a SIN municipality. 
The reason why we do not use a simple before-after estimator (comparing 
the
4.2.1 DiD  estimation 
 Cox regressions employed are stratified on munici-
place 
pra
   (1) 
where D(t) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 when SIN is in operation, 
 flows in the SIN municipalities before 1 September 2003 with the flows af-
ter) is that there could be changes in macroeconomic conditions that affect the 
labor market that has nothing to do with SIN. The DiD approach is an attempt 
to handle this problem by controlling for macroeconomic changes common to 
all locations in the same labor market area. Needless to say, the identifying as-
sumption is that the development over time in the reference locations capture 
the counterfactual development in the SIN locations, had SIN not been imple-
mented. We will pay attention to the plausibility of the DiD strategy in the 
presentation of the results. 
In the DiD estimations, the
pality. In other words, the estimations include fixed municipal effects. The es-
timations are performed with the partial maximum likelihood estimator.  
Let Z = 0, 1, 2, 3 denote employment, employment subsidy, work
ctice and all other intermediate treatments (except open unemployment). 
The hazard to leave unemployment for Z = 0, 1, 2, 3 is then modeled as 
3 ,..., 0 )), ( ) ( exp( ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 0 = + = z t D S t D m t h S t i i z i z i
e δ δ λ
i.e.  ) 2003 1 . ( ) ( Sep T I t D > =  , and  ) , ( 0 m t h ,  M m ,..., 1 =  is the baseline 
haza  eligible unem pal m. The indi-
cator variable S is equal to 1 if the observation is made in a SIN municipality, 0 
rd to Z = 0, 1, 2 or 3 for the ployed in munici
IFAU – Virtues of SIN—effects of an immigrant workplace introduction program  19  
 
otherwise. Thus,  2 z δ  measures the effects of SIN on transitions to employment 
(z = 0) or to IMT (z = 1, 2, 3).
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Here   is the baseline hazard to unemployment for those employed and 
in IMT, z =1, 2, 3 in municipality m. Thus, 
) , ( 0 m t h
u
2 α  is the effect of SIN on the haz-
ard to unemployment from employment, and  3 , 2 , 1 , 4 = z z α  estimates the ef-
fects within a particular IMT on the transition to open unemployment. 
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Here   is the baseline hazard to employment for those in IMT, z =1, 2 
3 in municipal m. Thus, 
) , ( 0 m t h
j
2 β  captures the effect on the hazard to employment 
from employment subsidies within SIN and  3 , 2 , 4 = z z β  estimates the effects 
                                                      
 
11 Note that the coefficient on S cannot be identified in the stratified regressions. 
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of SIN operating through work experience and the “other” IMT respectively. 
Naturally, we can also estimate the model with the different IMT:s counted as 
one state.  
A word of caution regarding how to interpret the different sets of estimates 
is warranted. The general problem is that there may be heterogeneous treatment 
effects in the population at risk. Suppose that SIN increases the hazard to em-
ployment, and that we see an increased risk of moving back to open unem-
ployment from employment under SIN. Since more people entered employ-
ment, the increased flows back to unemployment can be an effect of sample se-
lection, i.e. the ones observed in employment under SIN are different from the 
ones in employment under the non-SIN regime. A similar case can be made for 
transitions between the IMT:s and employment. 
Of course, altered selection into employment and different IMT:s may be at 
work even if we would not see any change in the probabilities of entering a 
particular state. One effect of SIN may simply be to reallocate individuals be-
tween different states. At the aggregated municipal level, this is an effect of 
major interest: does SIN improve the matching between individuals, employers 
and IMT:s? A drawback is that sample selection may hide individual within 
IMT effects, which are of course also of interest. We will return to the discus-
sion on the impact of sample selection in the presentation of the results. 
5 Empirical  results 
We begin the presentation of the findings by a very simple description of the 
probability of being in work 360 days after entering unemployment in the SIN 
and non-SIN locations by time of entry into unemployment. This type of analy-
sis gives a notion of the total reduced form effects of SIN. We then try to shed 
some light on different possible mechanisms. First, we study the flows from 
unemployment to employment or IMT:s. Then we consider the transitions back 
to unemployment, and finally turn to the impact of SIN on going from IMT:s to 
employment. 
5.1  A first look at the effects of SIN 
Figure 2 shows the probability of being in work 360 days after unemployment 
entry by location and 180-day period relative to September 1, 2003 (period “0” 
begins on this day). Observations to the left (right) of the left (right) vertical 
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line are made before (after) the implementation of the SIN program. Observa-
tions in between the lines may be partly affected by the SIN program. 
In the beginning of the observation period, the probability of being in work 
is much higher in the non-SIN locations. The gap then narrows as the probabil-
ity decreases more in the non-SIN locations compared to the participating mu-
nicipalities. In this figure it is hard to see any clear effects of SIN by comparing 
the developments after the implementation of the program. There is a dip and 
then a recovery in the SIN locations. A very benevolent interpretation is that 
this recovery resulted from the SIN program. However, many of the compari-
son locations exhibit similar dips and recoveries. 
The fact that the development over time differs across types of location is 
potentially troubling for the DiD approach. We have tried restricting the com-
parison locations to ones with a development before the SIN program similar to 
the one in the SIN location. However, such an approach is quite arbitrary com-
pared to the one based on official classifications of local labor markets. Fur-
thermore, the decline in the before period tends to be larger even with the re-
stricted comparisons. 
Our strategy in the formal analysis below will be to first perform DiD esti-
mations of the effects of the actual reform. Then, we analyze an imaginary re-
form supposed to have occurred one year before. In case the imaginary reform 
yields results that are qualitatively similar to those following the actual reform, 
we are less inclined to believe in the baseline estimations. In case we see no 
“effect” in the imaginary analysis, we find the baseline estimates more plausi-
ble. 
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Figure 2 Probability of being in work 360 days after unemployment entry, by 
location and 180-day period of entry 
Notes: Inflow in period “0” begins on September 1, 2003. The nth periods begin +/– n*180 days 
before/after this date. Observations to the left (right) of the left (right) vertical line are made be-
fore (after) the implementation of the SIN program. Observations in between the lines may be 
partly affected by the SIN program. 
 
5.2  The impact through different mechanisms 
We now turn to present the results regarding the different mechanisms poten-
tially at work. Throughout the presentation of the baseline results, we will dis-
cuss the estimates as showing the effects of SIN on the outcomes (i.e. assume 
that the DiD setup using the basic population restrictions described above re-
trieves the causal estimates). These assumptions will then be questioned and 
discussed in the sensitivity analysis of section 5.3. 
Figure A 1 presents the hazards from unemployment to employment, before 
and after the SIN reform in the SIN and the comparison locations respectively. 
The figure tells us three things: (i) the hazard rates are lower in the SIN mu-
nicipalities both before and after the reform; (ii) the hazards are lower after the 
reform compared to before; (iii) the decrease between the two time periods ap-
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pears to be smaller in the SIN municipalities. This is also the message of the 
second row of Table 6, which displays the estimated effect of SIN on the haz-
ards from open unemployment to employment. According to the DiD setup, 
there is a positive and significant effect on the outflow: the hazard rate in-
creases by about 12 percent. The table also shows that transitions to all of the 
three IMT:s were positively affected by SIN. The impact on employment sub-
sidies and “other” is quite moderate, but there is a substantial effect on the 
probability of entering work experience schemes. Figure A 2 shows that what 
actually occurred was that a difference present before the SIN reform was 
eliminated in the post-SIN period. Figure A 3 shows that very little happened to 
transitions into employment subsidies, whereas Figure A 4 shows a similar de-
cline in the transitions to “other” IMT:s in the SIN and the comparison loca-
tions. 
 
Table 6 Effects on transitions from unemployment to employment or intermedi-
ate treatments  
    Haz. Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
      
Employment  D 0.813 0.007  -24.070 0.000 
  SD 1.124 0.012  11.240 0.000 
Employment 
subsidy  D 0.861 0.028  -4.620 0.000 
  SD 1.056 0.040 1.430 0.153 
Work  exp.  D 0.763 0.018  -11.160 0.000 
  SD 1.140 0.032 4.580 0.000 
Other  D 0.841 0.007  -20.540 0.000 
  SD 1.048 0.010 4.740 0.000 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from Cox hazard regression estimation using the 
stratified partial maximum likelihood estimator. D measures the general before-after effect; SD 
is the DiD estimate (the difference in the before-after estimate between the SIN and the non-
SIN locations). 
 
The increased outflows from unemployment under SIN do not appear to 
have increased the flows back to unemployment, as shown by Table 7. The 
only statistically significant differences-in-differences estimate is for employ-
ment subsidies. Since there was no significant impact on the flows to this IMT, 
the somewhat increased return transitions may be of less importance. In terms 
of levels, Figure A 5 and Figure A 6 show that work experience is the IMT 
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with the highest hazards back to unemployment, at least during the first 200 
days. In general, the patterns are relatively similar in treatment and control lo-
cations. 
Let us now turn to transitions to employment among those who enter IMT:s. 
A potential effect of SIN is to provide a better/worse matching between indi-
viduals and IMT:s, or to alter the composition of IMT:s. Another type of effect 
is to alter the outcomes within a particular IMT. The first set of estimates in 
Table 8 captures the total effect after moving to any IMT, i.e. the sum of the 
above-mentioned effects. We see that the point estimate is small and statisti-
cally insignificant. The estimates presented in the lower part of the table sug-
gest that the only significant impact under SIN is that the hazard from work ex-
perience to employment increased by about 15 percent. Figure A 7 and Figure 
A 8 suggest that what happened was that the difference between SIN and non-
SIN locations diminished. Note also in the figures that the seemingly dramatic 
changes in the hazards from employment subsidies build on quite a small num-
ber of observations. 
 
Table 7 Effects on transitions from employment or intermediate treatments 
back to unemployment 
    Haz. Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
Employment D  .709  .009  -28.080  .000 
 SD  .998  .015  -.130  .895 
Employment 
subsidy D  .784  .038  -4.970  .000 
  SD 1.134  .064 2.220  .026 
Work  exp.  D 1.353  .041 9.920  .000 
 SD  .953  .034  -1.320  .186 
Other D  .967  .016  -2.050  .040 
 SD  1.015  .020  .740  .458 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from Cox hazard regression estimation using the strati-
fied partial maximum likelihood estimator. D measures the general before-after effect; SD is 
the DiD estimate (the difference in the before-after estimate between the SIN and the non-SIN 
locations). 
Do the positive within-effect for work experience and the zero overall DiD 
estimates of IMT:s make sense? Probably, yes. Work experience has pretty 
poor outcomes relative to e.g. employment subsidies. SIN meant an increase in 
the relative share in work experience, which counteracts the positive effects 
within the work experience IMT. The latter effect is not so surprising: those 
who enter work experience under the SIN program are to have a promise on 
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employment after finishing. Even though this does not hold in all cases, one 
can suspect that SIN makes case workers more restrictive and cautious in grant-
ing work experience schemes, and at the same time increases pressure on em-
ployers to stick to their promises. 
 
Table 8 Effects on moving from IMT:s to employment 
    Haz. Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
Any  IMT  D .505 .008  –45.78 .000 
 SD  1.026  .018  1.42   
Employment 
subsidy  D .574 .025  -12.740 .000 
  SD .961 .049  -.780 .433 
Work  exp.  D .663 .024  -11.510 .000 
  SD  1.146 .049  3.210 .001 
Other  D .448 .008  -44.260 .000 
  SD  1.008 .022 .360 .715 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from Cox hazard regression estimation using the strati-
fied partial maximum likelihood estimator. D measures the general before-after effect; SD is 
the DiD estimate (the difference in the before-after estimate between the SIN and the non-SIN 
locations). 
 
5.3 Sensitivity  analysis 
We have performed a number of robustness checks to test the plausibility of the 
results. We begin by presenting a few general specification tests before pro-
ceeding to a more fundamental discussion on the difference-in-differences 
strategy. 
5.3.1  General robustness checks 
A first type of variation was to investigate the possibility that the population in 
the treatment and the comparison locations were somehow different, which 
may make the DiD strategy invalid. The idea is of course that there may be dif-
ferences across groups in the reaction to local shocks. First, we simply re-
stricted the population to individuals born in the regions most frequent in SIN: 
Africa, Asia and Europe outside EU15. In a more sophisticated robustness 
check we then estimated the conditional propensity of entering SIN using a 
logit regression model with a large set of covariates for the SIN locations. The 
predictions from this model were then used to remove all comparison observa-
tions with a propensity to start SIN that was smaller than the smallest propen-
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sity for the SIN participants (846 individuals). For different levels of these pro-
pensities (16 groups) we then estimate separate treatment effects. We also tried 
including covariates in the regressions, controlling for potential changes in the 
differences of the population composition. None of these variations made any 
difference to the results. Dropping observations in the local labor market region 
where SIN was extended during 2005 did not have any impact on the estimates. 
As mentioned in the description of the reform, it has been argued that SIN 
was not working fully during the first year due to the need for recruiting new 
officers. We therefore moved the reform date to September 1, 2004 and ex-
cluded unemployment entries in the first year of SIN (Sep 2003–Aug 2004). 
This gave similar but somewhat stronger results in the sense that the positive 
impact on the transitions to work experience from unemployment was larger, 
and so was the impact on the flows from work experience to employment. This 
is vaguely in line with the notion that SIN grew more influential with calendar 
time. 
When we perform the analysis separately by gender, we find that the quali-
tative patterns are similar, but that the effects appear to be somewhat larger for 
women than for men. We have also estimated the models separately for some 
large regions (e.g. the Stockholm local labor market). The qualitative patterns 
are similar across regions. 
Let us also mention that we have approached the SIN reform in many alter-
native ways and that we have used the stratified Cox regression estimator with 
different levels of stratification. Estimating differences-in-differences linear 
probability models for the probability of being in employment at fixed times 
following entry to unemployment or IMT:s gives qualitatively similar results: 
an increased probability of being in employment,
12 working at least partly 
through better performance of the work experience schemes. Using calendar 
time stratification, propensity scores and calendar time and propensity score as 
stratification units also give qualitatively the same results. 
5.3.2  Analyzing an imaginary reform in September 2002 
The empirical strategy builds on the assumption that the only thing separating 
the development over time in the SIN and the non-SIN locations is the intro-
                                                      
 
12 Although questionable on the basis discussed in section 5.3.2. 
IFAU – Virtues of SIN—effects of an immigrant workplace introduction program  27  
 
duction of the SIN program. Put differently, what happened in the control loca-
tions would have happened in the treatment locations had the reform not oc-
curred. To test this assumption we analyzed an “imaginary” reform supposed to 
have taken place at September 1, 2002. To avoid observations affected by the 
real SIN reform, we censored the data on September 1, 2003. 
The results presented in the appendix cast doubt on the impact of SIN on the 
transitions from unemployment to work. The estimated impact is positive and 
significant, and of the same magnitude as in the analysis of the real reform. 
However, we do not find similar patterns for the effects on transitions to work 
experience, or for the hazard from work experience to employment. 
One can discuss the value of this sensitivity analysis. True believers would 
suggest that it captures a time trend that should be extended into the actual re-
form period, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy. 
However, the DDD approach means strong assumptions regarding the expected 
development over a longer period of time. Also, we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that there were e.g. differing institutional changes during the “imaginary 
reform” period which caused the estimates. Rejecting the baseline results 
would then be a mistake. Our reading of the results is that one must be very 
cautious in claiming that SIN directly affected flows from unemployment to 
work, but that the case is stronger for the effects going through work experi-
ence. 
5.4  An attempt to compare the costs and benefits of SIN 
We will now make some very rough calculations to compare the estimated 
benefits of SIN to the costs in a public expenditure perspective. There are 
countless ways of making such calculations, especially considering the many 
channels through which SIN may work. To get something remotely resembling 
estimates of the costs per job created, we calculate the costs per job-year added 
under different assumptions. Table 9 presents the calculations. 
First, let us describe the calculations in the baseline case, where our point of 
departure is that the only effect worth considering is the increased chance of 
going from work experience to employment. Thus, for now we assume that 
there was no change in the transitions to work from unemployment due to SIN 
(as suggested by the “imaginary reform” analysis). Also, the higher hazard into 
work experience schemes is ignored. This is correct if we assume that under 
steady state the number of program slots is fixed. An increased participation in 
one subpopulation is then matched by crowding out of other unemployed. 
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Note, however, that we include in the table scenarios with a larger number of 
jobs created than under the baseline assumptions. One could think of these jobs 
as a result of an increased number of work experience schemes. 
There were about 65,680 periods of unemployment in the SIN locations in 
2005 (extending to the full year based on entry patterns in 2004). In the pre-
SIN period, 6.4 percent of these ended in work experience, in other words 
4,200 observations. Now, the pre-reform hazard rate in Figure A 7 suggests a 
hazard of approximately 0.0015 per day, leading to 55 percent (= 0.0015*365) 
or 2,300 individuals finding work in the first year in the absence of SIN. With 
the estimated 15 percent increase in the hazard following SIN (Table 8), the 
number of added full-year jobs would be 340. We then need to make some as-
sumptions on how long these jobs will last. The pre-reform hazard rate back to 
unemployment is about 0.002 per day (Figure A 5), suggesting that jobs can be 
expected to last for 500 days (= 1/0.002), or 1.37 years.
13 Under these assump-
tions, the number of created full-year jobs is 466. Related to the annual cost of 
SIN of 126 million, the cost per job-years added is then about SEK 270,000. 
 
Table 9 Costs per job-year created under different assumptions 
Expected days in work: 








Jobs created:  Estimated cost per job-year 2005 (SEK) 
300 383,000  307,000  256,000 
340 (baseline)  338,000  270,000  225,000 
400 287,000  230,000  192,000 
500 230,000  184,000  153,000 
Notes: The number of jobs created and the duration of these jobs are based on the observa-
tions made in the data. See the text for further descriptions. 
 
                                                      
 
13 Remember that the transitions back to unemployment (from work experience and employment) 
appear to have been unaffected by SIN. 
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What happens to the estimated cost if we alter some of the assumptions? 
Varying the number of jobs created and the expected duration of each job of 
course affects the results; the estimates in Table 9 range from 153,000 to 
383,000. At the lower end this is below the annual cost of financial support per 
unemployed. At the higher end it is above that level. However, to compute the 
total fiscal benefits one would need a more complicated analysis (including e.g. 
added tax revenue due to more people working.  Also, we have here not taken 
into account any dynamic effects on reduced risks of future unemployment, let 
alone the individual welfare effects of working instead of being unemployed. 
An answer to whether the program is worth the money spent is thus contingent 
on assumptions of future labor market outcomes and the valuation of non-
monetary gains. To provide such an answer is far beyond the scope of this pa-
per. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
The SIN program targets refugees and immigrants whom are considered em-
ployable and ready to take a job immediately, but who are also expected to ex-
perience substantial difficulties in finding work. We use detailed population 
micro data on unemployment spells, intermediate treatments and final out-
comes combined with a differences-in-differences strategy comparing SIN mu-
nicipalities with non-participating locations in the same local labor markets to 
estimate the effects of the SIN program. 
The most robust result is that SIN increased transitions into work experience 
schemes. Also, going to work experience is associated with higher employment 
probabilities with SIN than in absence of the program. The impact of SIN on 
transitions from unemployment to work is muddled by the existence of similar 
difference-in-differences patterns in the years preceding SIN. 
 At first glance it may appear that the supported employment approach of-
fers a new—or at least largely unexplored—approach to help job seekers. 
Available previous studies, however, suggest that the actual implementation 
builds on better counseling and understanding of each applicant, combined 
with intensified efforts in finding work for the clients, and careful matching be-
tween unemployed individuals and employers. These are all elements of an in-
tensified job-search and matching assistance, which are of course not a new 
element of active labor market policies. Based on prior knowledge of the ef-
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fects of matching efforts, we would expect to see positive effects from SIN (see 
e.g. Blundell et al (2004) and Martin & Grubb (2001)). This is particularly the 
case since the resources added are quite significant relative the normal PES 
level. 
From a public governance perspective, the implementation of SIN could be 
criticized for deviating from the original intentions of a workplace introduction 
based on supported employment, and for using the SIN officers more or less as 
extra resources for intensified matching. On the other hand, in the way and at 
the level implemented in the ongoing trials, the SIN program appears to work 
relatively well. Departing from the original plan may therefore be considered a 
smaller problem. 
What is open for debate, however, is whether we would see the same ef-
fects, should the program be extended to a larger group of individuals (inside or 
outside the current target group). While theory and previous studies suggest 
that we should expect positive effects from this type of efforts in the general 
case, one could argue that successful matching between unemployed individu-
als and jobs presupposes a large pool of potential participants to choose from, 
relative to the number of people actually assigned to the program. Also, it is 
possible that the value of matching efforts is greater for the groups currently 
targeted due to their relative lack of networks of employer contacts. 
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Appendix A 
Testing the validity of the results by having an “imaginary” reform in the SIN-
municipalities on September 1, 2002. All unemployment spells extending into 
September, 2003 are removed from the analysis 
 
Table A 1 Imaginary reform 2002: effects on transitions from unemployment to 
employment or intermediate treatments  
    Haz. Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
      
Employment  D .927 .011  -6.320 .000 
  SD 1.105  .016 6.850  .000 
Employment 
subsidy  D .942 .045  -1.260 .206 
  SD  1.045 .058 .800 .424 
Work  exp.  D .525 .020  -16.990 .000 
  SD .990 .045  -.230 .818 
Other  D .896 .011  -9.130 .000 
  SD 1.018  .014 1.250  .210 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from Cox hazard regression estimation using the 
stratified partial maximum likelihood estimator. D measures the general before-after effect; SD 
is the DiD estimate (the difference in the before-after estimate between the SIN and the non-
SIN locations). 
Table A 2 Imaginary reform 2002: effects on transitions from employment or in-
termediate treatments back to unemployment 
    Haz. Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
Employment D  .558  .008  -39.500  .000 
 SD  .976  .017  -1.350  .176 
Employment 
subsidy D  .979  .043  -.480  .629 
  SD 1.067  .056 1.250  .213 
Work exp.  D  .869  .051  -2.380  .017 
 SD  1.065  .073  .920  .356 
Other D  .950  .019  -2.580  .010 
  SD 1.045  .025 1.850  .064 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from Cox hazard regression estimation using the strati-
fied partial maximum likelihood estimator. D measures the general before-after effect; SD is 
the DiD estimate (the difference in the before-after estimate between the SIN and the non-SIN 
locations). 
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Table A 3 Imaginary reform 2002: effects on moving from IMT:s to employment 
    Haz. Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>|z| 
Any  IMT  D .296 .005  -67.91   
  SD .984 .027 -.76   
Employment 
subsidy  D .470 .027  -12.930 .000 
  SD  1.040 .070 .590 .558 
Work  exp.  D .409 .021  -17.310 .000 
  SD .954 .059  -.770 .444 
Other  D .270 .006  -63.840 .000 
  SD .974 .023  -1.080 .279 
Notes: Table shows parameter estimates from Cox hazard regression estimation using the strati-
fied partial maximum likelihood estimator. D measures the general before-after effect; SD is 
the DiD estimate (the difference in the before-after estimate between the SIN and the non-SIN 
locations). 
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Figure A 1 Transitions from unemployment to employment. 
G = 1 (not SIN and before September 1 2003), G = 2 (not SIN and after September 1 2003) G = 3 
(SIN and before September 1 2003) G = 4 (SIN and after September 1 2003). Smoothing is per-
formed with the Epanechnikov kernel with the default bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 2 Transitions from unemployment to work experience 
G = 1 (not SIN and before September 1 2003), G = 2 (not SIN and after September 1 2003) G = 3 
(SIN and before September 1 2003) G = 4 (SIN and after September 1 2003). Smoothing is per-
formed with the Epanechnikov kernel with the default bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 3 Transitions from unemployment to employment subsidies 
G = 1 (not SIN and before September 1 2003), G = 2 (not SIN and after September 1 2003) G = 3 
(SIN and before September 1 2003) G = 4 (SIN and after September 1 2003). Smoothing is per-
formed with the Epanechnikov kernel with the default bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 4 Transitions from unemployment to “other” IMT:s 
G = 1 (not SIN and before September 1 2003), G = 2 (not SIN and after September 1 2003) G = 3 
(SIN and before September 1 2003) G = 4 (SIN and after September 1 2003). Smoothing is per-
formed with the Epanechnikov kernel with the default bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 5 Transitions from IMT to unemployment before September 1, 2003 
G = 1 (WE and not SIN), G = 2 (ES and not SIN) G = 3 (other and not SIN) G = 4 (employment 
and not SIN))¨G = 5 (WE and SIN), G = 6 (ES and SIN) G = 7 (else and SIN) G = 8 (employ-
ment and not SIN). Smoothing is performed with the Epanechnikov kernel with the default 
bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 6 Transitions from IMT to unemployment after September 1, 2003 
G = 1 (WE and Not SIN), G = 2 (ES and Not SIN) G = 3 (other and Not SIN) G = 4 (employ-
ment and Not SIN)), G = 5 (WE and SIN), G = 6 (ES and SIN) G = 7 (other and SIN) G = 8 
(employment and not SIN). Smoothing is performed with the Epanechnikov kernel with the de-
fault bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 7 Transitions from IMT to employment before September 1, 2003 
G = 1 (WE and not SIN), G = 2 (ES and not SIN) G = 3 (other and not SIN) G = 4 (WE and 
SIN), G = 5 (ES and SIN) G = 6 (other and SIN). Smoothing is performed with the Epanech-
nikov kernel with the default bandwidth in STATA. 
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Figure A 8 Transitions from IMT to employment after September 1, 2003 
G = 1 (WE and not SIN), G = 2 (ES and not SIN) G = 3 (other and not SIN) G = 4 (WE and 
SIN), G = 5 (ES and SIN) G = 6 (other and SIN). Smoothing is performed with the Epanech-
nikov kernel with the default bandwidth in STATA.  
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